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ABSTRACT
This paper utilizes a natural experiment to examine the role of the protection of property rights in
promoting investment. In order to explore a title-granting scheme in Shenzhen, China, I collect a
sample of 83 listed SOE firms, with 32 of them holding about-to-be-entitled lands. Those landholders
exhibit both a sharp short-term 7.8% additional increase in stock market price and a long-term
63% extra increase in investment, when compared with non-landholders, despite that there is no
pre-event structural difference between the two. These increases in value are a result of having
solved hold-up problems rather than a result of increased collateral values because those politically
connected SOEs under analysis are financially unconstrained. Cross-sectionally, those firms with
weaker pre-event protection against hold-up are associated with greater increases in share price and
investment. Potentially, solving the hold-up problem of all unentitled land would bring about value
of 2.2 Trillion RMB, almost triples Shenzhen’s GDP in 2009.
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One fundamental and widely accepted reason for strengthening property rights protection to
promote investment is that property rights solve hold-up problems (see Williamson 1976, Klein,
Crawford and Alchian, 1978, Hart, 1995). On a theoretical level, the hold-up problem arises in a
bilateral monopoly bargaining game where one party needs to make a sunk-cost investment. Given
the problem of incomplete contracts, the player would under-invest fearing that he or she will be
forced to share future cash-flows with the other party with bargaining power, after the investment
has been sunk (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). The solution to this hold-up problem
is a commitment mechanism to pre-commit not to expropriate the investor’s future cash flow. A
property right can serve as the commitment mechanism in this case, thus providing security to
investors. This mechanism is known as a security channel (Besley, 1995).
However, empirically identifying this security channel, through which property rights protection
promotes investment, is always difficult. This difficulty is two-fold. Firstly, a causal relationship
between the strengthened property rights protection and increased investment is hard to establish.
Any observable correlations between the two are subject to the endogeneity problem. This means
that the enhanced investment and better protection of property rights could be co-determined by
another omitted variable, e.g. technological advancement. This could also mean that causality
works in the opposite direction, with increases in investment promoting the protection of property
right1. Secondly, even if it is confirmed that the protection of property rights leads to higher
investment, one can hardly pin down through which channel the impact is exerted. For instance,
an alternative collateral channel, advocated by De Soto (2010) and recently confirmed by Chaney,
Sraer and Thesmar (2012), could also result in a causal relationship between strengthening property
rights and increased investment. Under the assumption that firms are financially constrained, the
collateral channel works in the following manner: lands that receive property rights protection can
be pledged as collateral for external finance, relaxing the previously binding financial constraints
and thus promoting investment2. In most settings, the security channel and the collateral channel
are indistinguishable because the demand for investment that is induced by more secured property
rights and the supply of credit that occurs when the collateral value has increased due to property
rights protection occur at the same time.
In this paper, I utilize a natural experiment that helps simultaneously solve the two empir-
ical problems mentioned above. This natural experiment involves an exogenous and universal
strengthening of property rights protection introduced by a title-granting scheme implemented in
the Shenzhen government that was announced on 25 November 2009. Under the title-granting
scheme, all firms that previously occupied “allocated land” (a form of untitled land with weak
property rights protection) were allowed to obtain titles for their land and enjoy a higher level
of property rights protection. The strengthening of the property rights is exogenous because the
entitlement of the allocated land was only a by-product of a policy intended to increase local land
supply3. This alleviates the endogeneity concern that the government’s decision to grant titles was
driven by investment opportunities for the allocated landholders. The program is universal as all
allocated lands received titles and there was no discretionary decision made about the inclusion of
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individual firms. This eliminates concerns about potential selection bias that might mean those
firms with the greatest investment opportunities participate in the program.
In order to explore this natural experiment, I constructed a sample consisting of all 83 listed
SOEs (or privatized SOEs) firms that are headquartered in Shenzhen. One crucial advantage of our
sample lies in the fact that political connections help separate the security channel from the collateral
channel. In China, the existence of immense state-owned banks has led to a highly distorted financial
system that favors SOE firms. Politically connected firms enjoy favorable loan policies and rarely
face financial constraints (Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007; Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2010). As
collateral channels are based on the assumption that firms are financially constrained, and since
political connections relax this constraint, our sample effectively shuts down the collateral channel.
All investment effects must therefore come through the security channel.
The sample is separated into a treatment group and a control group according to the individual
landholding situations of the firms. While all firms originally held allocated land before being listed,
only 32 firms still occupied allocated land at the end of 2009 when the title-grant scheme took place.
These 32 firms constitute the treatment group, while the other 55 constitute the control group. The
allocated landholding situation is exogenously determined by whether the firm implemented an IPO
or took part in an M&A transaction after 2001, since when a decree by the Shenzhen government
has required that all allocated lands associated with post-2001 IPO or M&A deals be converted into
fully titled lands.
I find an instantaneous stock market reaction as well as a long-run real impact of the natural
experiment. Within a two-day window following the official announcement of the title-granting
scheme, firms in our treatment group on average exhibited an extra cumulated abnormal return
(CAR) of 7.8% compared with the control group. The effect is statistically and economically
significant. This CAR is corresponding to a 49 million increase in value per hectare of land.
Considering that the total area of unentitled land amounts to 450 square kilometers, or 45000
hectors, the total potential value that could be brought about by solving the hold-up problem in
Shenzhen is 2205 Billion RMB, almost triples Shenzhen’s GDP in 2009, which was 820 Billion RMB.
Notice that this 7.8% extra CAR is a residual effect because the relevant land value is subtracted
from the CAR to correct for the effect of land value appreciation. As a land title is granted to the
current landholder for free, the extra value brought by the land title must be subtracted in order to
capture the pure value released by the land titles in solving the hold-up problem.
The real impact was also phenomenal. Within next 3 years after the announcement, the firms
within the treatment group were associated with a 63% extra increase in investment relative to the
control group. There were also significant increases in other real performances variables, including
external finance (52%), employment (8%) and profitability(34%).
In order to further confirm the effect of the security channel, I explore the cross-sectional
heterogeneity of characteristics in pre-event property rights protection. Security channel theory
hypothesizes that firms with ex ante weaker protection of property rights would react more ag-
gressively to the event as less benefit is internalized for those firms. I use two measures to analyze
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the extent of pre-event property rights protection. The first measure is that of tenure expiration.
Ceteris paribus, those firms whose land tenures have expired are expected to be associated with a
higher risk of being expropriated compared to firms with unexpired tenure. The second measure is
that of local government connections. As the majority of land being expropriated is taken back by
local government, a connection with the local Shenzhen government is expected to greatly lower the
risk of being expropriated. I find that this was indeed the case. Those firms with a lower level of
protection, either in terms of tenure or local government connections, exhibited a higher level of
CAR and increments in investment. This result is in support of the security channel hypothesis.
Two sources of problems may affect our estimation. (1) The treatment group and the control
group may differ in certain characteristics, observable or unobservable, and these differences may
bring about differences in post-event performance, thereby causing an upward bias in our estimation.
(2) The stock market reaction may result from a pure distribution effect, namely land value
appreciation. I make two attempts to alleviate the first concern. Firstly, I demonstrate that there is
no systemic difference between the treatment group and the control group in terms of the main
corporate characteristics that may affect long-term performance, including political connections,
corporate governance structures and industry distribution. This similarity also extends to the key
elements of the financial statements, such as ROA and Tobin’s Q, measures reflected in the accounts
at the end of 2009 and evidenced in the changes between 2006 and 2009. Secondly, in order to
alleviate the concern of unobserved characteristics, I exclude those firms listed after 2001 and reach
a similar scale of property rights-investment sensitivity. If the difference in firms’ performance after
2001 is determined by some unobservable characteristics, or self-selection decisions that are related
to the listing year, those firms that were listed after 2001 should have exhibited increasing variance
in unobservable characteristics. As a result, excluding those firms should lead to a lower coefficient
if those features are related to post-event performance. The fact that my data demonstrate a result
of similar scale suggests that the unobservable feature problem is not a severe issue.
I tackle the issue of the distribution effect by exploring the differences among non-landholders.
As those non-landholders are not granted land titles, there is no distribution effect. However the
security channel indicates that, under the assumption that titled land is under-supplied in Shenzhen,
those who have access to the Shenzhen land market are associated with a positive CAR. This is
evidence of value unlocked by land titles that solves the hold-up problem. Consistent with this
prediction, I find that firms that were associated with a higher possibility of purchasing land in
Shenzhen, such as firms headquartered in Shenzhen and firms that had higher business exposures in
Shenzhen, displayed a higher CAR within a two-day window after the announcement of the launch
of the title-granting scheme. This evidence confirms the existence of a security channel in a context
in which the distribution effect is silenced.
This paper is related to the literature on property rights protection and investment. As part
of a large and diverse literature dealing with property rights protection for households4, Field
(2005; 2007) explores the natural experiment of an urban squatter land entitlement scheme that
was implemented in Peru in 2004 and finds a significant enhancement in investment. Galiali and
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Schargrodsky (2010) find results of similar scale using Argentinean survey data. As their papers
mainly focus on the changes of behaviors in squatting households living in slums, their results leave
open the question of what the response of firms operating in a relatively developed environment
would be. In that vein, I see my work as a complement to and an extension of their work in detecting
the causal link between property rights and investment in a more entrepreneurial world. Another
advantage of exploring data of listed firms has been that I have been able to see the daily stock
market price of firms under analysis. The instantaneous, positive and significant market reaction to
the announcement of the title-granting scheme gives the argument presented in this paper more
credibility in its assertion that value was released by this particular change in policy.
This paper is also linked with existing literature that attempts to distinguish the property rights
channel from the collateral channel, through which the property rights protection affects investment.
In one important contribution, Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) demonstrate that property
rights can influence investment in ways other than the collateral channel. They survey firms within
five post-communist transition economies and find that firms re-invest less of their retained profit
when perceived property rights protection is weak, even if they have sufficient collateral for external
finance. This paper shares the same theme in detecting the role of the property rights channel when
the collateral channel is muted. While their paper only exploits the cross-sectional variation at the
firm level, the natural experiment setting in this paper has allowed me to extend their research by
adding a more dynamic flavor and more rigorous identification by utilizing the difference-in-difference
methodology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the institutional background
to the natural experiment taking place in Shenzhen. Section II presents the data. In section III
and section IV, the empirical results of the differences in market reactions and in real economic
performance between the landholding and non-landholding firms are presented. In section V, I
explore the effect of non-landholders’ access to Shenzhen land market over firms’ performance in
stock market reactions. Section VI concludes.
I. The Institutional Background: Title-Granting Scheme in
Shenzhen
In this section I provide an description of institutional background. I demonstrate that the legal
protection of property right for allocated land is extremely weak and the title-granting scheme,
by offering legal protection to land users, presents an opportunity to solve this under-investment
problem.
A. Pre-event Property Right Protection Situation
There is a large amount of land in Shenzhen with no proper title attached to it. Those lands are
called “allocated lands”5. An “allocated land” is a piece of land that is allocated by the government
to SOEs by means of a fiat order. These allocated lands are a legacy of the central-planning
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economic system that dominated China before the 1990s. In this central-planning economy where all
market-based land transactions were forbidden, direct distribution from the government to SOEs was
the only method of conveying land to its user. The title status of allocated lands and corresponding
weak property rights protection were mainly unchanged during the period of progressive land system
reform from the 1990s to 2000s. By the end of 2009, the total area of allocated land in Shenzhen
was 113 square kilometers, almost ten percent of its non-agricultural land. Most of it is being used
by SOEs or privatized SOEs6.
Compared with fully entitled land, allocated land is exposed to a higher level of risk of being
expropriated. Expropriation may come from either the government or other private individuals.
Government expropriation is made possible by the out-dated legal status of allocated land and the
absence of an extensible tenure system. By design, the allocated land is state-owned land that is
provided for firms to use for free. There is no legal mechanism to prohibit the government from
taking back the allocated land7. As the land user does not have to make any payment for the
usage, and accordingly, the government does not have pay any compensation to landholder when
expropriating the land. Although the Shenzhen government stipulates a 30-year tenure8 for all
allocated land, most of those tenures, as they started in the 1980s, have expired or are approaching
their expiration date. Moreover, there is no effective mechanism for land users to negotiate an
extension to their tenure9. Allocated land without protection of tenure is especially vulnerable to
government expropriation; cases of the government expropriating allocated land are very common.
In the most recent case, the Shenzhen government took back 12 plots of allocated land in one
campaign aiming at improving land-use efficiency during 2012.10.
Vulnerability to expropriation by other private citizens comes from the absence of a registration
system for allocated land. The Shenzhen government does not have a unified registration bureau for
title registrations, and all previous land distributions are not properly registered especially for those
allocated lands. A lack of registration undermines exclusiveness in the use of land and this issue is
reflected at both the distribution stage and use stage. When land is being allocated, the lack of
registration causes a “multiple allocation” problem. That is, different government departments, out
of self-interested motivations, issue multiple fiat orders to allocate the same piece of land to more
than one land user. Naturally, this has caused many disputes about the legitimate right to the land.
The dispute over the land also rises after the land is allocated. Although the transaction of the
allocated land is explicitly forbidden, there are many illegal transactions in the form of “informal
lease contracts”11. As there is no centralized registration bureau to record information regarding
transactions over the land, one piece of land could be sold to multiple buyers, making it impossible
to identify the legal user of the land. Numerous anecdotes illustrate the severity of this problem. A
developer wished to demolish an existing building on a piece of land for a renewal project, but six
separate individuals claimed that the land was allocated to them. Each of them could produce a
bona fide certificate from various government officials and their total compensation amounted to
ten times the value of the land itself. In the end, the developer was forced to abandon the renewal
project12.
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B. Title-Granting Scheme
This lacking of protection and under-investment problem is addressed by a title-granting scheme.
On 13 November 2009, the Shenzhen government announced the “City Renewal Program”. The
core of this program is that all those allocated lands distributed many years ago are now allowed to
obtain titles13. The risk of being expropriated either by the government or other private citizens
dramatically declines with the endowment of the land titles. The newly entitled land has better
protected tenure and a registration system to ensure the exclusive right of its user. The new 30-year
tenure is endorsed by a legal contract between the government and land use, rather than a fiat order.
Expropriating the land before tenure expires requires that the government pay a large amount of
compensation, measured by the market price of the land and constructions above it. A new file
with user rights and a history of transactions, leasing and collateralization records was constructed
in the registration bureau to ensure exclusivity and to avoid future disputes with other rights
claimants. These measures greatly alleviated land users’ concerns regarding land being expropriated
and enhanced the incentives for investment.
Two other features of the title-granting scheme are worth emphasizing. Firstly, the title-granting
scheme is exogenous in that the improvement of economic activity on the allocated land is not the
main purpose of the policy. Without this exogenous characteristic, one might concern that the
policy, which was designed to promote investment, was driven by other factors such as investment
opportunities. The purpose of the title-granting scheme was to relax the previous tightening land
supply by granting land titles to those “squatted lands” that account for a larger area than the
allocated land. The squatted lands are those occupied by farmers residences and the total area of
squatted land is 330 square kilometers, almost three times that of the allocated land. As those
lands are larger in area and lower in productivity, granting titles to those lands is prioritized relative
to allocated land. Before the “City Renewal Program”, there were a series of policies targeting an
increasing land supply by releasing the squatted land14.
Secondly, the title-granting scheme is universal in that all allocated lands are affected by this
policy. Without this universal characteristic, one might concern that the improvement in economic
activity is caused by a selection bias. Namely, those who have better investment opportunities are
more likely to be included in the title-granting scheme. This is not the case in this title-granting
scheme as all lands as long as they are located within the jurisdiction of Shenzhen government are
automatically qualified for this title-granting scheme.
Two other conditions must be satisfied so that the title-granting scheme will have a significant
impact over firms’ behavior: (1) There must be a shortage of land supply in Shenzhen City and
(2) the alternative method for those allocated land to receive titles must be limited. The violation
of either of above conditions means that title-granting scheme is redundant. Firstly, Shenzhen is
famous for its shortage of entitled land supply. As a Special Economic Zone, Shenzhen is not allowed
to extend its boundary, as all other Chinese cities are, in order to prevent the favorable policy
that was issued exclusively to Special Economic Zones from leaking to other areas. Any boundary
changes need approval from the State Council, the highest administrative institute in China, and
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the boundary has remained unchanged in the last 30 years since Shenzhen was established15. As a
result, Shenzhen is facing an extremely tight land supply, evidence in the highest construction area
as percentage of total area in China, 46%, almost double the level of 24% of its populous neighbor,
Hong Kong. By the end of 2008, it was reported that residual land available for transfer by the
local government was less than 43 square kilometers. That was not enough to fulfill the requirement
for construction for the next three years.
Secondly, the other channels for granting titles to allocated land are fairly restricted. The
“direct conversion” of allocated land to entitled land is allowed by law, but in reality is prohibited
by conflicts of interest with local government. The local government is allowed to “convert” an
allocated land into entitled land, by granting the land titles to its current user. However from
the perspective of the government, this conversion is dominated by the “expropriation-auction”
method, in which the government expropriates land and then auctions it to the highest bidder.
The government prefers the latter since the “expropriation-auction” method, not only generates a
higher transaction price by attracting the bidder with highest subjective value toward the land, but
also grants the government a higher share of the proceeds. The government retains 100% of the
proceeds from transaction while in the “conversion” method only 40% of total proceeds go to the
government16. As a result, no firm is allowed to convert the allocated land into entitled land except
for those about to initiate an IPO or M&A, as discussed in next section.
In summary, the City Renewal Policy is a unique method of dramatically strengthening the legal
protection of previously allocated land. It takes place in a city with both a shortage of entitled land
and a previously rigid land policy. Moreover, it is exogenous and universal so that it is not related
to the investment opportunities of individual firms. While it is clear that the City Renewal Policy
will grant more legal protection of the property rights to land users, there remains an empirical
question as to the impact of this policy on stock prices and real-world performance of the land users,
a question that will be explored in the next section.
II. Data and Sample
This section discusses how the sample is constructed and how it is segmented into the treatment
group and the control group. I illustrate the comparison between the treatment and the control
group in terms of various pre-event characteristics and no systematic difference appears. Then I show
that there is a significant difference between the two in post-event responses, both in short-term
stock market reaction and in long-term real investment.
A. Sample, treatment and control group
The analysis requires a sample of all Shenzhen firms with political connections. To achieve that,
I obtain all firms that were listed in China before 2009, at which point the natural experiment occurs,
regardless of the exchanges where they are listed. I then keep only SOEs or privatized SOEs firms
headquartered in Shenzhen. SOEs firms mean those firms where the government, central or local,
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controls the majority of its stocks. Privatized SOEs are those firms that used to be SOEs but now
the majority of shares are in the hands of private individuals. In order to identify if a firm is a SOE
or a privatized SOE, I use the information of listed year and IPO prospectus. Those firms that were
listed before 1998 are SOEs or privatized SOEs since the first genuine private firm that was listed
on Chinese exchanges finished its IPO in 199817. For those listed later than 1998, I downloaded the
prospectus of those firms and checked if the firm was founded by a private individual or reformed
from an existing SOE entity. After excluding financial institutions and real estate companies, I
obtained a sample of 83 firms.
I then partition the sample into the treatment group and the control group. The treatment group
consists of those beneficiaries of the title-granting scheme. They have allocated land under control
by the end of 2009 when the title-granting scheme was announced. The control group includes those
firms that do not have allocated land, although they may operate in those entitled lands.
The key variable in this study is whether listed firms have allocated land that will receive titles in
the City Renewal Program. The information came from self-disclosures of landholding firms, either
via a special disclosure report or their annual report. There are 32 listed firms that disclosed their
land position. The disclosure was partially compulsory: all listed companies on the Shenzhen stock
exchange are required to make a special disclosure report when accumulated increases/decreases
within the past three trading days reach a threshold of 20%18. There are 17 firms disclosing their
land holdings via a special disclosure report. The rest voluntarily disclosed their landholding in
their annual reports following the title-granting Scheme.
Although the regulation body does not require a particular format or specific information, most
firms did provide sufficient detail. Indeed, I managed to find key details about the land belonging
to these firms: their location, area, and current usage and whether it was shared with other users.
For example, SHENZHEN SEG CO. LTD disclosed that their firm has two pieces of land:
“. . . The first piece is located in Bagua Industry Park. It is now a three-floor factory with a
construction area of 1,593 square kilometers. The tenure is from 1985 to 2015. Currently it is leased
out with an annual rent of 600,000 RMB. . . The second piece is controlled by our subsidiary, Sege
Baohua Co. Ltd. It is in Huaqiangbei Industry Park. The total area is 2,213 square meters and
with a construction area of 10,509 square meters. The tenure is from 1982 to 2012. Currently it is
leased out with an annual rent of 25 million RMB . . . ”
I cross-check our information with other resources. For instance, HuaChuang Securities, one of
the top investment banks in China, released a Special Report about this title-granting scheme in
Shenzhen and listed all the firms that could benefit from it. Our list has a large overlap with the
HuaChuang Securities list of beneficiaries of the title-granting scheme.
I obtain the daily stock prices and financials information of listed firms from the China Securities
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. It is the largest and most comprehensive
database of its kind and contains all trading prices and financial statement data for listed firms
trading on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. For the financial statement data, I use data
from the semi-annual report of 2009 as it is the last report released before the launch of the City
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Renewal Program on 13 November 2009. I also use land-price information in Shenzhen to estimate
the value of a title when allocated land changed to public land. These land prices are found on the
website of the “Urban Planning Land and Resources Commission of Shenzhen Municipality”, the
government land agency, and “Soufang Web”, the largest online land information provider in China.
B. Treatment/Control group’s similarity in pre-event characteristics
One immediate question is why firms in the control group do not have allocated land. This
is due to a change in IPO/M&A policy in Shenzhen in 2001. Before 2001, allocated status was
maintained when the landholder is listed or acquired by other firms. In January 2001, the Shenzhen
government required that all allocated land must to be converted to entitled land when its holding
company is publicly offering its shares or experiencing a major M&A event. This move was to seek a
fairer transaction value for the state-owned asset19. As a result, all SOE enterprises that were listed
or engaged in M&As after 2001 have no allocated land, while those listed and that underwent M&A
before 2001 do. Figure 1 demonstrates the time sequence of entitlement of Shenzhen’s allocated
land.
Table I illustrates the difference in observable characteristics between the treatment group and
the control group. Column (1) is the whole sample of 83 firms. Column (2) is the treatment
group consisting of all allocated landholders. Column (3) is the control group which contains all
non-landholders. The control group is further stratified into two groups, those allocated after 2001
(column 4) and those involved in acquisition after 2001 (column 5). The t-statistics of the t-test of
column (3) (4) and (5) compared with column (2) are presented in parentheses.
Four major characteristics of those firms are illustrated. The major event time includes the
established year and the listed years of those firms20. Not surprisingly, the landholders are listed
earlier compared with the non-landholders and the main difference derives from the sub-sample of
firms that are listed after 2001. Another difference between the landholders and non-landholders is
the proportion of SOEs: 77% of landholders are SOEs while only 58% of non-landholders are SOEs.
This closer political connection is also reflected in the party member ratio and city government
official ratios, two main measures for political connections, although the difference is only marginal
and insignificant. The rest of Table I shows two other aspects of those politically connected firms:
their corporate governance and their industry. Those two variables are tightly related to firms’
performance (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999) and thus any difference in those two respects,
between the treatment and the control group, may also cause bias in our result. However there is
no significant difference in either the corporate governance or industry distributions. Overall, firms
in the treatment group resemble those in control to a great extent over those observable variables.
Apart from those observable differences, there could be some unobservable differences in charac-
teristics between the treatment and the control group that could lead to a performance difference.
In columns (1) to (3) of Table II there is a comparison of a list of financial statement characteristics
by the end of 2009. The economic performances of the two are almost identical, as demonstrated
by a similar Tobins Q and ROA. The difference is that those firms in the treatment group are
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on a smaller scale, as evidenced in a smaller total asset, employment and profit. However this
difference in scale does not necessarily mean a difference in recent-year productivity. It may come
from the difference in scale of those firms when they were established. In columns (4) to (6), there
is a comparison of increment in performance from 2006 to 2009 between the treatment and control
groups. All t-statistics are statistically insignificant. This suggests that the recent year performances
of the treatment and control groups are almost identical.
To summarize, despite the fact that the firms in the treatment group are listed earlier and
are smaller in scale compared to the control group, they are almost identical in terms of political
connections, corporate governance, industry distribution and performance over the past three years.
This alleviates concerns that our result is driven by the differences in firm characteristics between
the treatment and control groups.
C. Difference in performance after the event
On 25 November, the Shenzhen government announced that a “City Renewal Program” was
about to be implemented21. This program was to distribute titles to the land occupiers of allocated
land. Figure 2 is the CAR of the treatment and control groups within 60 trading days around the
announcement of the policy. The CAR is estimated using the Fama-French (1992) three-factor
model with a beta estimation window lasting from 250 to 40 trading days prior to the event. The
difference in stock market reaction between treatment and control groups is stark. During the first
two days after the event, the treatment group reacted to the news with a jump of over 15% with
respect to the CAR while the reaction of all control group firms was less than 1%. The reaction was
completely driven by the event. This is no pre-existing difference between the treatment and the
control groups. The effect is also long-lasting: the difference remains very high even 30 days after
the event.
Figure 3 displays the investment level of the treatment and the control group before and after
the announcement of the entitlement scheme. While for the control group there was no major
change in the trend in recent years, there was a spike in the amount of investment that starts in
2010 and ends around 2013. This rise in investment peaked in 2011, which is one year later than the
launch of the title-granting scheme. The difference between the treatment group and the control
group is a more than 70% increment relative to the level in 2007.
Table III formalizes the information provided in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In panel A, there is an
extra CAR of around 13% between the landholders and non-landholders within a two-day window
after the title-granting scheme is announced. Apart from some leakage of information before the
announcement day that pushed the stock price of landholders up by 4%22, there was no significant
difference in CAR between the two groups in a period lasting from 30 to five days before the event
and the period from the second to the 30th day after the event.
One concern about the stock market reaction is that it merely illustrates a distribution effect
rather than solving a hold-up problem. Namely, since the land title has value, the increases of the
market prices of those landholders may completely reflect the value of land title they are about to
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receive, rather than the value that is about to be unlocked by those titles by solving the hold-up
problem that previously had a detrimental effect on firms’ investment. To overcome this problem,
one should subtract the value of the land title from the abnormal return in order to obtain a residual
CAR that corresponds to pure value of security channel. I use the market value of the would-be
entitled land as a proxy of the value of the land title. (The would-be entitled land is currently
allocated land that is about to be converted into entitled land.) Notice that as the value of would-be
entitled land is always larger than the value of the titles, this method will generate a lower bound
of the value created by title net by solving the hold-up problem.
I estimate the value of would-be entitled land by multiplying area and price. Land area
information is obtained from disclosures made by the listed firms. Land-price information is
provided using the average recent transaction price in the neighborhood of the allocated land, found
on “Soufang Web”. In the fifth row I report the residual CAR. The result is still positive and
significant. There remains a 9% gap in residual CARs difference between that of the landholder and
the non-landholders.
Panel B of Table 3 reflects the changes of investment within six years around the announcement
of the title-granting scheme. For the first two years after the announcement, the landholders
experienced an increase in investment of 99% when compared to the 2007 level, while there was
only a 31% rise in non-landholders. The difference in investment for 2012 to 2013 was also as large
as 30%.
III. Analysis of Stock Market Reaction
In this section I use multivariate regressions to investigate the difference between the landholders
and non-landholders in the short-term CARs. I illustrate that (1) landholders exhibit a much higher
CAR relative to non-landholders and (2) in line with the security channel, those firms with weak
pre-event property rights protection are associated with a higher CAR.
A. Base-line Regression
Table IV provides the results of multivariate regression analysis across firms within the sample
of Shenzhen’s politically connected firms. I estimate the following base-line model:
CARi = α+ β land dummyi + γ control variablesi + i
The dependent variable is the CAR, the cumulative abnormal return within two days after the
announcement. The main independent variable is the land dummy, which is assigned a value 1 for
the landholders and 0 for non-landholders. Column (1) illustrates the result from the regression
without any control variables and fixed effects. The coefficient of the landholding dummy is around
12.3% and is highly statistically significant. In column (2) the regression includes control variables
and industry and exchange-fixed effects. The control variables consist of firms’ financial statement
variables, such as total assets, leverage ratio, tangible asset ratio, Tobins Q and ROA, and political
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connection variables such as SOE dummy and listing year. The coefficient of the landholding dummy
is almost the same compared with column (1), indicating that the difference in CAR does not derive
from the observable difference in firm characteristics.
In column (3), I use the residual CAR as the dependent variable. As mentioned before, the
residual CAR is the CAR with the value of the entitled land subtracted. Remaining statistically
significant at 1%, the coefficient decreases to 7.8%. This result suggests that the value of the entitled
land is taking up to 5% of the market capitalization, a relatively large-scale value. Moreover, the fact
that the value unlocked by solving the hold-up problem bypasses the market value of the entitled
land illustrates the importance of the perceived security in investment decisions when encountering
the risk of being expropriated.
One concern about this result is that it is driven by some outliers, i.e. firms with the largest land
value relative to their market capitalization. In column (4), I exclude four firms with the largest
land value/market capitalization ratio. The coefficient increases instead of decreases compared with
our benchmark regression in column (3) and is still statistically and economically significant. This
greatly alleviates the concern and supports the suggestion that that the above result is a universal
effect.
From column (5) I attempt to measure the absolute value of the market price appreciation,
against the total area and total value of the land. The hypothesis is that if the stock market reaction
is indeed resulting from the land, under the mild assumption that the firm’s investment per unit
of land is fixed, those firms with a large area of land, measured by total hectares or total value
of the land, should display a higher response in terms of total value of market price appreciation.
The dependent variables of column (5) is the increase in the total market capitalization realized
within a two-day window after the announcement of the title-granting scheme, net of the value of
the would-be entitled land. The independent variable of column (5) is the total area of the would-be
entitled land. The positive coefficient in column (5) suggests that for each extra hectare of land,
there is an increase of 49 million RMB in the firm’s value. This emphasizes the importance of
property rights protection in promoting investment and maximizing social value and it has great
economic implications. If all unentitled lands, amounting to 450 square kilometers, are about
to receive titles, the total value would release value of 2.2 Trillion RMB, almost three times of
Shenzhen’s GDP in 2009.
B. Heterogeneity in Property Rights Protection
In this section I explore the cross-sectional heterogeneity among firms. If the absence of the
enforcement of the title is the root of the under-performance of those allocated landholders, those
which are more restricted before the entitlement should display a more substantial reaction when
the restriction is lifted by the title-granting scheme. I use two different measures for the property
rights protections. The first measure is the residual tenure of the land. In Shenzhen, allocated land
usually has 30 years of tenure23. Although the government can also take the land before the tenure
expires, the expiration of the tenure greatly increase the likelihood of the land being taken back by
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the government. As most of the land was allocated in the early 1980s, when the Shenzhen Special
Zone started, tenures of a majority of allocated land have already expired. Only 11 out of 32 firms
announced that their land tenures have not expired. I categorize the firms according their land
tenure status as those with expired tenure have less legal protection.
The effect of the residual tenure on landholding firms is illustrated in column (6). The dependent
variable is the residual CAR,namely CAR net of the value of the entitled land. The independent
variable is the tenure dummy which assign 1 to those firms with a unexpired tenure and 0 if tenure
has expired. The result is in line with the prediction of the security channel. The negative coefficient
suggests that those firms with expired tenure or with weaker protection of property rights have
higher increases, of more than 5%, in CAR compared with firms with unexpired tenure. The
coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level.
Our second measure for the property rights protection is the connection of a firm with the
Shenzhen government. As by far the largest risk to the allocated land comes from the Shenzhen
government taking back the land24 a good connection with the Shenzhen government can decrease
this risk and provide the firm with better protection. I measure the political connection of a firm
with the Shenzhen government by checking if it is owned directly or indirectly by the Shenzhen
government. In the treatment group, there are 12 firms that belong to Shenzhen government and the
rest are ultimately controlled by central government or large-scale private conglomerates. The result,
shown in column (7),confirms that those with a weaker connection to the Shenzhen government
perform better. Those firms with a Shenzhen government connection are outperformed by more
than 4% compared with SOEs affiliated to central government and private firms in two-day market
performance. The result is at 10% significance in t-tests.
The fact that Shenzhen firms are associated with a lower abnormal return helps exclude another
interpretation of the result the anticipation effect of the market. The anticipation effect suggests
that the movement of the stock price may not be a pure reaction to the current event, but may
also incorporate the expectation of other events occurring. This is especially true about China
as the Chinese government, under certain economic situations, may release a series of stimulus
measures to promote investment25. Because of the correlation between the policy releases, one
policy would greatly increase the possibility of sequential policies being issued. In that case, the
land-granting scheme may be a herald of future local fiscal stimulus policies and the stock market
reaction could incorporate the aggregated effect of foreseeable policy change. However, this is not
likely to be the case in this title-granting scheme. Firstly, as I mentioned above, the main target of
this title-granting scheme is to increase land supply by granting titles to squatted land rather than
to improve the performance of those allocated landholders. The entitlement of the allocated land is
merely a by-product. Secondly, because any local economy promoting fiscal policy would benefit
Shenzhen firms to a greater extent relative to other firms because of the local protectionist nature
of Chinese governments (Bai et al, 2004; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). If the main part of the
stock market reaction comes from the anticipation of future economic stimulus, one would see that
the Shenzhen firms react more aggressively when the news is announced.
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Overall, the result confirms that firms that are associated with a weaker protection exhibit a
higher abnormal return, in line with the hypothesis that it is the endowment of the land title that
drives the abnormal market reaction.
C. Robust test
In this section I stratify the sample according to various criteria in search of more evidence that
the rise in market capitalization derives from the role of property rights protection that decrease
the risks of being expropriated faced by the landholders. The regression setting is the same as the
one shown in column (3) of Table IV with the dependent variable being the CAR net of the value of
the entitled land.
One main concern is that the treatment group and the control group are not randomly allocated.
Although I demonstrate that there is no difference for various observable characteristics, it could be
the case that some difference in unobservable features is driving the result. Two main differences
between the treatment and the control group, the different year of being listed and the SOE portion,
may be correlated with the unobservable result-driving characteristics. If this is the case, those
firms that are listed in closer years should have similar unobservable characteristics compared with
those firms that are listed in years that are further apart. For instance, two firms both listed in
1995 should have smaller unobservable difference compared with one firms listed in 2009 and one
firm listed in 2005. Moreover, including firms listed before and after year 2001 raises concern of the
self-selection problem. That is, firms with certain characteristics, intentionally delay their listing
time in order to benefit from the post-2001 land policy and the post-event performance difference
is merely a reflection of this characteristics. This self-selection problem also suggests that using
a sub-sample consisting of firms listed before 2001 should yield a smaller result if unobservable
characteristics between the treatment and the control group contribute substantially to our result.
The result is shown in column (1) and column (2) of Table V. In column (1) is the regression
result of the whole sample, which is the same as column (3) in Table IV. In column (2), I only
include in the regression those firms that are listed before 2001, when the IPO-related land policy
was changed. As illustrated by Table I, there is no significant difference in the IPO year between
the treatment and the control group firms listed after 2009. If the result is driven by certain
characteristics that are also correlated with the listing year, then the second regression, with listed
years closer to each other, should be associated with a lower coefficient compared with the second
one. However, the result shows that the opposite is true. The coefficient of the whole sample
is almost the same compared with the coefficient from regression of whole sample. This result
reconfirms that our result comes from the value of the land instead of the unobserved characteristics
that are associated with the firm listing year.
Secondly, I partition the sample according to the ownership of those firms. SOE firms, as they
already enjoy a better property rights protection, should be associated with a lower reaction when
their lands are entitled. In this sense, the SOE is merely another measure of the pre-event property
rights protection, along with two other measures (i.e. expired tenure and Shenzhen government
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connections). I stratify the sample into SOE and non-SOE sub-samples. If the CAR results from
the strengthened property rights protection, the non-SOE sample should respond more aggressively.
This hypothesis is supported by the data. The coefficient of the SOE sub-sample, illustrated in
column (3), is smaller than that of non-SOE sub-sample, illustrated in column (4). This result
suggests that the result does not derive from the ownership difference between the treatment and
the control group.
Thirdly, I segment the sample according to the extent to which the firms are financially
constrained. As discussed before, one salient feature of our sample is that firms in the sample
are not facing severe financial constraints because they are politically connected SOEs. Central
and local government provide implicit guarantees for the loans issued to those SOEs affiliated to
them so that commercial banks have few concerns over the possibilities of SOEs defaulting. Extra
collateral, in that case, adds no value to those firms at all and, as a result, the collateral channel is
naturally muted (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). If this assumption is not true, i.e. that financial
constraints and collateral channel are also playing a role in our sample, one would expect that those
firms with a higher level of financial constraint would be associated with a more aggressive response
to the stock market as more land is now pledgeable as collateral. In column (5) and column (6) I
test this hypothesis. I use the Scale-Age (SA) measure, following Hadlock and Pierce (2010)26, to
quantify the extent to which firms are financially constrained. In contrast to the prediction of the
collateral channel, those firms that are financially constrained in column (5) display a lower level of
reaction compared with those with lower levels of financial constraint in column (6). This result
renders us more confident that our sample is immune to the collateral channel and captures purely
the effect of property rights by solving the hold-up problem.
One important issue regarding SOEs in China concerns their efficiency. Due to poor corporate
governance, SOEs are usually criticized for draining government’s resources by investing in non-
profitable projects. Our data provide evidence that the opposite is true; SOEs are indeed engaged
in investments that maximize their profit. Firstly, the fact that there is a positive residual CAR
suggests that SOE firms are making positive NPV projects. Moreover, I segment the sample
according the investment opportunities measured by Tobins Q. If SOE firms are making investment
decisions to exploit their profitable investment opportunities, one would expect that within those
firms with high Tobins Qs there is a larger difference between the landholders and non-landholders
than within those firms with low Tobins Q. If, on the other hand, the investment decision they
made is not relevant to the profitability of a project, then there would be no difference between
the two. The results in column (7) and column (8) indicate that SOE firms also maximize their
profitability. The coefficient of the regression of the higher Tobins Q sub-sample is higher relative to
that of low Tobins Q firms by almost 50%. This suggests that the SOEs are also profit maximizers.
Another source of the change of the stock market price is from the changes of discount rate, or
beta. A decrease in beta leads to a higher market price, even when the expected future cashflow
is constant. A sudden change of discount rate, although not likely, is not completely implausible
given the fact that the firms’ land may provide more business opportunities. In Figure 4, I plot
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the average beta of the treatment group over a time span of five years prior to five years after the
announcement of the title-granting scheme. There is no sign of a decrease in beta. In fact, the
average beta of the firms in the treatment group is in a growing trend from 2006 to 2009, which
indicates that the share price should have decreased were it not for the cashflow effect. This evidence
confirms that the increases of share price are resulting from the change of future cashflow instead of
the future discount rate.
IV. Analysis of Real Effect
In this section I utilize a difference-in-difference method to explore the differential effect in the
investment for the firms in the treatment group compared with those in the control group.
A. Base-line Regression
Table VI provides the result of a multivariate regression analysis across firms within the sample
of Shenzhen’s politically connected firms. I estimate the following base-line panel data regression:
Investmentit = α+ landi + postt + β landi ∗ postt + γ control variablesi + i
The dependent variable is the capital expenditure for each firm each year between 2007 and
2013, in either the treatment or control group. The parameter of interest is the interaction term
between the land, the landholding dummy variable, and the post, the post-event dummy indicator.
Control variables consist of the pre-treatment characteristics of those firms that includes total assets,
book leverage ratio, ROA, tangible asset ratio, cash holding ratio,SOE ratis and listed year. The
regression results are illustrated in Table VI. Column (1) is the regression result for the base-line
settings. The coefficient of the interaction term between the land dummy and post dummy is 0.63,
which indicates that there is an increase of 63% in total investment for those landholding firms in
the four years following the announcement. This is also statistically significant.
However, the result of differences in increases between the treatment and the control group may
stem from any policy or economic situation change that has differential effects between landholders
and non-landholders. I use three different methods to exclude the possibilities of the other source of
real performance difference to ensure that this extra increase in investment is indeed resulting from
the fact that treatment group firms have land. I demonstrate that landholders’ enhancement in
investment is more illustrative during the first two years immediately after the event than the two
years after that. Then, I illustrate that the firms that are weakly protected before the event are
associated with a higher level of investment increment. Lastly, I show that the firms with higher
CAR increase their investment more dramatically.
Firstly, I further decompose the post-event period into two parts, the period between 2010 and
2011 and the period between 2012 and 2013. If the enhancement in investment is indeed derived
from the title-granting scheme, which started in 2009, then the investment increases during the
two-year period immediately after the launch of the program should be associated with a higher
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level of investment relative to that of the second two-year period, under the assumption that the
long-delayed investment will take place immediately once the title is granted. In column (2), I
put a dummy variable that is 1 for the year 2010 to the year 2011 and 0 otherwise, and I interact
this year [2010, 2011] dummy with the interaction of land and post, the variable of interest in
regression in column (3). The coefficient of the Y ear[2010 − 2011] ∗ Land ∗ Post is positive and
statistically significant. This suggests that those landholding firms are investing 28% more in 2010
and 2011 compared with 2012 and 2013. The fact that treatment group firms display a higher
level of investment immediately after the title-granting scheme supports my hypothesis that the
title-granting scheme is the root of sequential years’ enhancement in investment.
Secondly, I explore the heterogeneity of pre-event protection of property rights across firms to
see if those firms that are less protected before react more aggressively to the title-granting scheme.
As mentioned before, I use two different measures for the property rights protection. In column
(3) I use a dummy variable indicating if the 30-year tenure of the allocated land held by that firm
has expired or not. The dummy variable is assigned a value 1 if the tenure has not expired and
0 if it has expired. I then interact the expiration dummy with the Land ∗ Post, the variable of
interest in column (1). This coefficient of the new interaction is negative, although not statistically
significantly so. This suggests that firms that are under stronger protection because their tenure
has not expired are associated with less post-event investment enhancement because they already
internalized the partial benefit of title protection.
In column (3) I used a connection with the Shenzhen government as a measure of the extent to
which property rights are protected. Those firms that are affiliated to the Shenzhen government
are less likely to experience land expropriation, simply because the majority of land expropriation
comes from the Shenzhen government. I put a dummy variable that assigns 1 to Shenzhen-affiliated
firms and 0 to other firms. The coefficient of the interaction term between the Shenzhen connection
and the Land*Post is displayed in column (3). It is negative and statistically significant, indicating
that those firms with strong pre-event protections due to political connections with the Shenzhen
government experience a less aggressive response.
Thirdly, I investigate the relationship between the instantaneous CAR and the long-run increases
of investment. If the investment enhancement and the CAR are both the result of the entitlement
of the land, then there is a positive relationship between the two. Under the assumption that the
rate of return between various investment opportunities faced by landholders are roughly the same,
those firms holding investment opportunities with a higher NPV project are about to have large
profit, reflected in a higher level of cumulative return. In column (5) I display a dummy named
CAR above median, which is assigned a value 1 if the two-day residual CAR is about the median
level of the treatment group. I then interact this variable with the Land ∗ Post, the variable of
interest in column (1). The coefficient of the new variable is both positive and significant. That is,
those firms with a higher-than-median CAR are associated with a level of investment increment.
18
B. Other Real Performance Variables
The higher level of increment in investment of landholders leaves one wondering whether the
title-granting scheme has effect over other real variables. There are three variables that are of
particular interest for our study: external finance, profitability and employment. External finance
shows how those investments are funded, or what the ratio of internal/external finance in the whole
investment is. Profitability conveys whether the investment is made over positive NPV projects.
Finally, employment levels illustrate whether the title-granting scheme has any impact on the labor
market and on solving the unemployment issue.
In column (6) of Table VI the dependent variable is external finance. The coefficient indicates
that the landholding firms raise 52% more capital than the non-landholders, both compared with
2007. The coefficient is also statistically significant. The scale of this coefficient is smaller than that
of investment. This indicates that firms are using both their internal and external capital to fund
their new investment implemented on the newly entitled land.
In column (7) and (8) the employment and profitability are dependent variables, respectively.
The coefficient of the interaction term of Land ∗ Post are both positive. The scale of the coefficient
indicates that the landholding firms exhibit a 8.3% extra and 34.2% extra increases in profitability
increments after the title-granting scheme compared with non-landholding firms. The fact that the
scale of increases in employment is much less than those of investment reveal the capital-intensive
nature of the new project, probably due to adopting more advanced technologies. At the margin, its
expansion is less reliant on hiring more people but more reliant on making more fixed investment.
The fact that the increase in profitability is a less compared with investment increases indicates the
decreasing marginal productivity of those large-scale investments.
C. Robust Check
Similar to part C of section III, I divide the sample along four dimensions to check if the
difference in performance across the sub-sample is in line with the predictions of the role of the
property rights protection. The panel data regression setting is the same as the one shown in column
(1) of Table VI, with the dependent variable being the capital expenditure for each firm each year
between 2007 and 2013.
I firstly use a sub-sample of the data, including only firms that are listed before 2001. As
mentioned before, one concern for this study is that the result is driven by the differences in some
list-year-related unobservable characteristics between the treatment and the control group. The
other concern is a self-selection bias exist. Firms with certain characteristics choose to be listed after
2001 and those characteristics lead to a difference performance. The above two issues suggest that
using a sub-sample consisting of firms listed before 2001 should yield a smaller result if unobservable
characteristics between the treatment and the control group contribute substantially to our result. A
comparison between column (1) and column (2) allows one to reject this hypothesis. While column
(1) is the regression result of the whole sample, column (2) shows the result of the sub-sample of
firms listed after 2001. The fact that the latter coefficient is slight larger than the former suggesting
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that the listing year is not correlated with some unobservable factors that play a major role in the
result.
Secondly, I stratify the data according to ownership. Non-SOE firms, due to their weaker
political connections, face a higher risk of being expropriated before the event. As a result, their
increases in investment should be higher than those of the SOE firms who already internalize the
majority of the protection that the land title would bring about. The results in column (3) and
column (4) are consistent with this prediction. The coefficient of the SOE group is smaller and
statistically insignificant, while that of the non-SOE group is larger and significant.
Thirdly, I segment the sample according to the extent to which the firm is financially constrained.
If firms are financially constrained before the title-granting scheme, then the more constrained firms
should react more aggressively to the event compared with those less financially constrained. As
mentioned before, I use the SA measure following Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as the measure of
financial constraint and the hypothesis that firms are universally constrained is rejected. Those
more financially constrained firms, illustrated in column (5) are associated with lower increases of
investment compared to those non-financially constrained firms illustrated in column (6).
Lastly, I partitioned the sample according to Tobins Q to investigate if firms are making profitable
investments. Tobin’s Q measures the investment opportunities of the firms, and a higher level of
Tobins Q indicates that the firm has more positive NPV investment opportunities. If those SOEs
are not maximizing their economic profitability, then one would expect that the coefficient of a
regression of the high Tobins Q sub-sample would not be different from those of lower Tobins Q.
However, this hypothesis is rejected. The coefficient of high Tobins Q is more than two times that
of the low Tobins Q sub-sample, with the former much more statistically significant compared to
the latter. The result suggests that SOEs, despite their poor corporate governance, are also making
investment decisions in an attempt to maximize their profit.
In summary, the above analysis confirms that the differential effect between the treatment group
and the control group comes from the entitlement scheme that grants land titles only to landholders
in the treatment group. Other factors, such as unobservable characteristics or collateral channel,
appear to contribute little to the result.
V. Analysis of Non-landholding Firms
The preceding analysis has provided evidence that the market reaction and investment enhance-
ment of landholders results from the title-granting scheme. There are, however, two concerns about
this analysis. The first concern is that the sample size, which is 83, may not be sufficiently large to
make a statistically credible estimation. The second concern is that the increases in stock market
reaction only reflect a distribution effect rather than a real effect. Although I have already illustrated
that firms in the treatment group respond more aggressively to the title-granting scheme relative
to the control group with respect to investment, external finance, profitability and employment,
the issue of the distribution effect is still worth considering in order to provide more convincing
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evidence of the title’s role in solving hold-up problems and promoting investment.
In this section I consider non-landholding firms so as to help solve the two above-mentioned
problems. Firstly, there are more firm-level observations for the non-landholders, simply because
most listed firms in China do not have allocated land in Shenzhen. Secondly, those non-landholders
are naturally immune to the distribution effect because no value is conveyed to those firms with land
title granting. However, those non-landholders could also potentially benefit from the title-granting
scheme, simply because the supply of entitled land is extended. Under the assumption that there is
a shortage of land supply in Shenzhen and firms have unsatisfied pre-event land demand, those firms
that have positive NPV projects but cannot implement them because of the absence of secured
revenue can now buy the land, make the investment and realize investment returns. As a result,
one would expect those firms that can buy land in Shenzhen to exhibit a positive abnormal return
even if there is no land title granted directly to them27. The positive abnormal return should be the
discounted value of their return on investment over their would-be obtained land considering their
expenditure for the land.
I estimate the following base-line model:
CARi = α+ β Shenzhen dummyi + γ control variablesi + i
It is clear that those non-landholding firms that have access to the Shenzhen market are more
likely to benefit from the title-granting schemes. I use a dummy variable, Shenzhendummy, that
assign a value 1 to those firms that are headquartered in Shenzhen and 0 to the others, in order
to capture the benefit brought to firms located in Shenzhen. Control variables consist of the
pre-treatment characteristics of those firms that includes total assets, book leverage ratio, ROA,
tangible asset ratio, cash holding ratio,SOE ratis and listed year. All landholding firms are excluded
so as to eliminate the distribution effect of valuable title granted. The base-line result is displayed
in column (1) of Table VIII. The coefficient of the Shenzhen dummy is positive and statistically
significant. Its economic scale suggests that those firms that are headquartered in Shenzhen display
a 1.1% extra CAR relative to those non-Shenzhen firms.
I then investigated the cross-sectional heterogeneity among firms in their need of protection
provided by land titles. The variable I used to quantify the extent of need of the firms to the land
titles was asset reversibility. Asset reversibility is an indicator of the cost one firm has to incur in
order to liquidate its asset. The easiness of liquidation is related to a firms asset compositions and
varies across industries. If the risk of expropriation is the concern of land users, those firms with a
lower level of asset reversibility, or a higher liquidation cost, are more sensitive to this risk as any
failure for these firms means a larger loss. Following Guiso and Parigi (1999), I use the reverse
of the average co-movement of sales of the individual firm, with its industry average as the asset
reversibility. A higher level of co-movement across firms within one sector indicates that one firm
needs to make a large loss to sell its assets in a fire-sale because other firms within the industry are
also subject to the same systematic shock (Pulvino, 1998). As a result, firms in that sector display
low asset reversibility.
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I followed the method proposed by Guiso and Parigi (1999) to construct a co-movement measure.
First, I obtained the sales of individual firms from 2000 to 2009 via the CSMAR database. I then
normalized the sale value by subtracting its sample historical mean and then divided it by its
standard deviation. The normalized value is then regressed on the industry average sale value on
a time-series regression with the R-square taken down. The average industry-level R-square is an
indication of the co-movement of that sector and is also the reverse indicator of asset reversibility
within that sector. In our sample, the industry average R-square ranges from 0% to 7% with an
average level of 0.7%. I excluded all landholding firm observations so as to avoid any contamination
of the result from the supply side of the land market.
The interaction term between the industry co-movement and the Shenzhen dummy is the
variable of interest. Its coefficient represents the difference in market reaction for Shenzhen firms
with higher/lower asset reversibilities. The security channel predicts a positive coefficient for this
interaction term, namely firms with a higher demand for security in Shenzhen will be associated
with a as higher market reactions once the land title is granted. The result is displayed in column
(2). The coefficient of the interaction term is both positive and statistically significant. It confirms
that the security channel is effective for those non-landholders.
The second measure of asset reversibility is the average scale of the firms within one sector.
Ghosal and Loungani (2000) find that the investment-uncertainty negative relationship is of greater
significance for small firm-dominated sectors. That is, industry concentration is a negative indicator
of asset reversibility. The rationale they provide is that larger firms face a lower level of asset
reversibility because they can re-deploy the asset within many different production lines. This
intra-firm diversification capacity decreases the cost when the asset is being disposed of. On the
other hand, when lacking this capacity, the disposal cost is pushed up for smaller firms. I use the
total sales of the top 10 firms in each industry as a percentage of the total sector share and as a
measure of whether the sector is dominated by small firms. The top 10 firms on average take 12%
of total sales, with the minimum and maximum values being 0% and 82%, respectively.
The result is shown in column (3) of Table VII. The coefficient of the interaction between the
Shenzhen firm and industry concentration is negative and significant. It suggests that for those
concentrated industries that the firms are relatively larger in scales, the response to those exogenous
shocks was smaller relative to those with smaller firms. This is in line with the fact that the need
for the land title protection of those larger firms are relatively weaker as they can re-deploy the
asset within the company.
Apart from the variation in the demand for land title protection, I also exploit the heterogeneity
of the supply side of the land titles. Firms that are larger in size and with political connections
are more likely to obtain the entitled land28. In column (4), only SOE firms are included and the
coefficient increases from 1.1% to 1.9% with higher statistical significance, despite the fact that
a smaller sample is used. In column (5), only firms with a larger-than-median size are included.
Again, the coefficient is increased from 1.1% to 1.8%, with higher statistical significance. These two
columns provide evidence that the increases in stock market value of those non-landholding firms
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are coming from their future purchases of entitled land and the revenue from investment in those
lands.
I further investigate the heterogeneity among firms that are not located in Shenzhen. Those
firms that already have business exposure in Shenzhen are more likely to purchase land and to
take advantage of the extension of land supply in Shenzhen relative to those firms that have no
business relationships in Shenzhen at all. I use the percentage of the bank loans from Shenzhen
banks as a proxy of a firm’s exposure in Shenzhen. On average, 3% of loans are from Shenzhen bank
for non-Shenzhen firm, compared with that 79% loans of Shenzhen firm are from Shenzhen banks.
The coefficient of the Shenzhen exposure of non-Shenzhen firms is reported in column (6) of Table
VII. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the tighter business
connection with Shenzhen the non-Shenzhen firms have, the more likely the firm is to benefit from
the title-granting scheme.
VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of property rights protection on investment by exploring an
natural experiments in Shenzhen, a title-granting scheme. Two features of its empirical setting
make this study specially interesting as it does not suffer from the problems that normally plague
these types of investigations. (1) The title-granting scheme is both exogenous and universal so as
to alleviate the endogeneity and self-selection bias concerns. (2) Firms in the treatment group,
those landholders, are not systemically difference from non-landholders in control group, in terms of
various pre-event characteristics and performance measures. The fact that firms in our sample are
all politically connected provides an rare opportunity to observe the pure effect of security channel,
namely the effect of property right protection on investment by solving the hold-up problem, rather
than an aggregate effect of security and collateral channel. I find that those firms that were holding
allocated land before the scheme are associated with significant increases both in market prices and
investments compared with firms without allocated land. The effect is more pronounced for those
firms with weaker pre-event protections. The economic application is huge. Potentially, solving the
hold-up problems of all unentitled land would bring about value of 2.2 Trillion RMB, almost three
times of Shenzhen’s GDP in 2009.
23
Notes
1Besley (1995) provides an interesting case in which peasants in Ghana invest in growing trees
in order to protect their property rights to certain plots of land.
2Potentially, a third channel, the transaction channel, through which land with property rights
is easier to sell at market price, also contributes to investment, although in my setting the effect
of this channel is marginal, mainly because the ban on sale is hardly enforced and the pre-event
transaction of the allocated land is pervasive.
3The main target of the title-granting scheme is to give titles for the squatter-occupied land,
which accounts for a larger area in Shenzhen than allocated land.
4See Besley (1995), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2002), Jacoby, Li and Rozelle (2002), Field
(2005, 2007), Goldstein and Udry (2008), and Galiali and Schargrodsky (2010). And see Besley and
Ghatak (2009) for a good survey.
5Another form of unentitled land, squatted land in Shenzhen, also accounts for a large portion of
land in Shenzhen. However it is irrelevant to our study.
6Data from Wang, Chen and Chen (2012), “some tips from Shenzhen City Renewal Program for
western area”, research on development, 05, 2012
7“Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer
of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas”, article 47 stipulates that the
government has the authority to take back the allocated land without any compensation.
8In 2004, the Shenzhen government released the “Provisions of Shenzhen government on Real
Estate expired land renewal” that specified the renewal fee for the land that expires. However no
owner of the expired land actually handed in the renewal fee for land renewal.
9Provisional Regulations of Land Management for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1981
10See Huaxia News, 16 March, 2013.
11Under a 50-year lease contract, the current land user leases out the land to the buyer who pays
all rental fees in a lump-sum.
12Interview Kaihong Li, the participants in Shenzhen urban planning, by Nanfang weekend. The
problem of absence of registration is most severe for allocated land used by small-scaled firms. For
the large-scaled firms that appear in the analysis of this paper, as the information of their allocated
24
landholding is public information, this problem is not fatal
13Some requirements have to be met by the land user for obtaining the approval of government.
Those requirements include: 1) the land owner should hand in a proposal for renovation of the
buildings above the land, and it has to be approved by the government. 2) about 15% of the total
area of the land should be handed to the government for public use.
14Other measures, including a policy that promoted voluntary user right registration and granting
the land user transaction rights launched in 2004, all ended with failures.
15On May 31, 2010, the boundary of Shenzhen was extended for the first time since its establishment
in 1981. Its total area increased from 995 square kilometers to 1,948 square kilometers.
16That is, the land user receives 60% of the value of the land when it is converted into entitled
land.
17The first non-SOE firms, New Hope Group, were listed in 1998.
18See Regulations on Stock Listing in Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
19Procedures regarding property issues in SOE reforms/reorganizations in Shenzhen, 11 January
2001. Shenzhen Government.
20Notice that the established year for SOEs may not be the year during which the firm is founded;
it may be the year when the firm was reformed from its pre-existing, outdated, centrally planned
predecessor.
21On 13th Nov, 2009, the news that a title-granting scheme was about to launched appeared in
some local newspapers in Shenzhen. However due to the limited influence and lack of credential of
those papers, the news was ignored by the public until the government made a official announcement
in a press conference on 25th November.
22The first round information was released on 13th Nov, 2009 by local news papers. However due
to the adverse track record of these newspapers in disclosing reliable information, the information
they released does not cause much market reaction.
23“Provisional regulation of Shenzhen land administration”, Shenzhen government,1981
24The risk of expropriation by other private citizens is also lower for those Shenzhen-connected
firms. That is because the Shenzhen court, the arbiter of the land rights dispute, is under the
control of Shenzhen government
25One famous example is that Chinese central bank release sequential policy changes, including
25
downward adjustments of reserve required rate, with a frequency of one adjustment per month for
seven consecutive months, between December 2010 and July 2011, in order to promote GDP growth.
26There are many other measures regarding financial constraints, such as Almeida et al. (2004)
and Lamont et al. (2001). However almost all of those measures include the value of the dividend
payment. Chinese firms are notorious for not paying dividends, not because of financial constraint,
but because the poor corporate governance. See Faccio et al. (2001) As a result, all above
measures are noisy in that they have a tendency to measure corporate governance on top of financial
constraints.
27The increase of land supply derives mainly from the previously squatted land by farmers in
Shenzhen. The City Renewal Program allows those farmer squatters, once the titles are obtained,
to sell the land to firms at any negotiated price.
28Qian and Weingast (1997) demonstrate that local governments are competing with each other
for investment from foreign or large-scale domestic firms. As a result, larger firms are more likely to
receive titles from a local government that has an incentive to use land as a stimulus to promote
local GDP. Similarly, firms with political connections are also regarded as main recipients of the
land as the local government is the sole land distributer in China.
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Figure 2. Stock Market Reactions to the Announcement of the Launch of the Title-Granting
Scheme
This figure presents the average CAR of all 32 listed firms that disclosed their landholdings around
the launch of the City Renewal Program. The solid line is the CAR from 30 days before the event
and 30 days after the event. The dashed line is the CAR of 51 non-landholders. The CAR is
estimated using the Fama-French (1992) three-factor model with a beta estimation window lasting
from -250 to -40 trading days prior to the event.
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Figure 3. Investment Changes as Responses to the Title-Granting Scheme
This figure presents the investment changes within a seven-year observation window around the
title-granting scheme for landholders and non-landholders. The solid line is the averaged annual
investment level for those 32 landholders while the dashed line is the averaged annual investment
level for those 51 landholders. All observations are normalized by dividing their 2007 level.
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Table III Differences in Stock Market Reactions and Real Responses between Landholders and Non-
landholders
Total sample Landholders Non-Landholders ∆(t-stat)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
CAR [0,2] 0.04 0.14 0.01 9.64***
CAR [-5,2] 0.04 0.18 0.00 9.44***
CAR [-30,-6] 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08
CAR [3,30] -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -1.20
Residual CAR [0,2] 0.03 0.10 0.01 6.37***
Panel B
∆Investment [2008-2009] 1.46 1.47 1.45 0.04
∆Investment [2010-2011] 1.52 1.99 1.31 1.74*
∆Investment [2012-2013] 1.40 1.60 1.32 0.55
This table provides the statistics on the stock market reaction and real performance of landholders and non-landholders. The
CAR is estimated using the Fama-French (1992) three-factor model with a beta estimation window lasting from -250 to -40
trading days prior to the event. The residual CAR is the CAR net of the normalized value of the would-be entitled land. The
Investment is the capital expenditure that was made by specific fiscal year. The fourth column shows the t-statistics of the
two-tailed t-test. ,*,** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Figure 4. The Averaged Beta of All Landholders
This figure presents the average beta of all landholders from 2005 to 2014. The solid line is the
market beta estimation window lasting from -250 to -40 trading days prior to the event. The
dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the estimates using standard errors clustered at
the level of industries.
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